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S.Ct. No. 40010 
D.Ct. No. CV-2011-88 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW Appellant Dean Harrell, through counsel of record Deborah Whipple, 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 118, and offers this Brief in Support of his Petition for ~view. 
Review is requested because, as set out in Mr. Harrell's Opening Brief in this appeal, which is 
incorporated in full herein, the district court erred in denying DNA testing of a blood stain and 
summarily dismissing Mr. Harrell's petition for post-conviction relief. The procedural history 
and statement of facts are contained in the Opening Brief as is all argument in support of relief. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an unpublished decision filed January 3, 
2014. A copy of the decision is attached to this brief. Mr. Harrell asks that this Court accept 
review of his case in the interests of justice. IAR 1 l 8(b ). Upon review, he asks that this Court 
1 -BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
reverse the order denying DNA testing and remand for further proceedings in the district court. 
Respectfully submitted this £1 day of February, 2014. 
~¥ Deborah Whippleu 
Attorney for Dean Harrell 
2 -BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Deborah Whipple, hereby certify that on this btf.day of February, 2014, I deposited 
two true copies of the foregoing motion in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Mark Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Idaho State Attorney General, Criminal Law 
Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 303 
Filed: January 3, 2014 Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
STATE OF IDAHO, THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia 
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 
Judgment summarily dismissing amended second successive petition for 
post-conviction relief, affirmed. 
Deborah Whipple of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, Boise, for 
appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 
General, Boise, for respondent. 
GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge 
Dean Allen Harrell appeals from the judgment of the district court summarily dismissing 
Harrell's amended second successive petition for post-conviction relief seeking DNA testing. 
Because the DNA test results would not show that it is more probable than not that Harrell is 
innocent of the victim's rape, we affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Underlying this post-conviction relief action is Harrell's rape conviction. The facts, as 
previously set forth by this Court, are as follows: 
On July 30, 1998, a Cassia County sherif:f s officer was dispatched to the 
residence of S.K. Upon entering the residence, the officer observed that S.K. 's 
eyes were black and swollen, that her lips were puffy, that she had blood on her 
arms and hands, that there was blood on the floor, bed, and walls, and that a 
number of items in the residence were broken. S.K. told the officer that she had 
been beaten and raped. Based upon information collected by the police, Harrell 
was arrested on July 31, 1998, and charged with rape, LC. § 18-6101(4), and 
burglary, I. C. § 18-1401. Harrell entered a plea of not guilty and a trial was 
scheduled. 
A friend of the victim testified at trial that she, Harrell, and a number of 
other people arrived at the victim's home at approximately 1 :30 a.m. on the 
morning of July 30, 1998. She testified that Harrell had been wearing a tank top, 
faded blue Wrangler jeans, scruffy cowboy boots, and a green ball cap. Finally, 
the friend testified that Harrell remained at the victim's home after she and most 
of the other people left at approximately 3:00 a.m. 
Another friend of the victim testified at trial that she returned to the 
victim's home and knocked on the front door. She testified that a man walked 
out, shut and locked the door behind him, and said that the victim was asleep. 
Although she did not notice the man's face, the friend testified that she knew the 
man was Harrell because he was wearing the same clothing that she saw him 
wearing earlier that night. She further testified that Harrell ran very quickly to his 
truck and sped off without turning on his headlights. Finally, the friend testified 
that she continued to knock and that when the victim answered the door, she was 
"bare naked, bloody and beat" and was yelling that she had just been raped. 
One of the officers testified at trial that he first confronted Harrell in the 
parking lot of a local cafe on the following day. Harrell agreed to talk to the 
police and led them back to his residence where Harrell agreed to let the officers 
look around. The officer observed that Harrell was wearing a pair of blue 
Wrangler jeans which appeared to be stained with blood. In Harrell's residence, 
the officer discovered a pair of laced-up leather boots and a light-colored tank top 
which also appeared to be stained with blood. Harrell admitted that he had been 
wearing the pants, the lace-up boots, and the tank top on the previous night. The 
officer asked if he could take Harrell's pants for testing, and Harrell agreed. 
When Harrell removed his pants, the officer discovered that Harrell's underwear 
was also stained with blood. Harrell admitted that he had worn the underwear on 
the previous night. Harrell voluntarily gave his underwear to the officer. 
A sample of the blood found on Harrell's underwear was DNA tested by 
the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement. A criminalist from the department 
testified at trial that the results of the DNA test excluded Harrell as a source of the 
blood. The criminalist testified that the results showed, however, that the victim 
was a potential source of the blood. 
The officer also testified that Harrell agreed to meet the officers at their 
office for further questioning. The officer observed that there were numerous 
"fresh" scrapes and cuts on Harrell's hands, which the officer believed were the 
result of hitting somebody in the teeth. During the interview, Harrell admitted to 
having sex with the victim and stated that "everything was going good and then it 
turned to shit." Harrell also stated that he didn't know how things got out of 
hand, that he didn't realize that he hit her that hard, and that he hated going to jail 
for something he didn't mean to do. Following the interview, Harrell completed a 
written statement in which he stated, "Everything was going good, and the next 
2 
minute, everything got out of hand, and she started telling me she didn't want to. 
She wanted to go to bed, and that is when it got out of control." 
State v. Harrell, Docket No. 25985 (Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (unpublished). 
The jury found Harrell guilty of rape and acquitted him on a burglary charge. The district 
court imposed a unified life sentence, with twenty-five years determinate. In State v. Harrell, 
Docket No. 25985 (Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (unpublished), we affirmed Harrell's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. In Harrell v. State, Docket No. 28371 (Ct. App. May 14, 2004) 
(unpublished), we affirmed the district court's order denying Harrell's initial petition for 
post-conviction relief. In Harrell v. State, Docket No. 33273 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008) 
(unpublished), we vacated the dismissal of Harrell's successive petition for post-conviction relief 
and remanded the case. In Harrell v. State, Docket No. 36559 (Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2010) 
(unpublished), we affirmed the district court's summary dismissal, on remand, of Harrell's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Harrell then filed a second successive petition for post-conviction relief and subsequently 
filed an amended second successive petition for post-conviction relief requesting DNA testing on 
his underwear. 1 The State filed a motion to dismiss, and Harrell filed a motion for DNA testing. 
The court held a hearing, and afterwards, Harrell filed a memorandum in support of his motion 
and in opposition to the State's motion to dismiss. The State filed a reply. The court then issued 
a memorandum decision summarily dismissing Harrell's amended second successive petition for 
post-conviction relief. Harrell appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Harrell contends the district court erred by denying DNA testing of the blood stain on his 
underwear and summarily dismissing his amended second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. Under Idaho Code § 19-4902, a petitioner may file a petition seeking DNA testing on 
evidence that was secured in relation to the trial that resulted in his conviction if the evidence 
was not subjected to the requested DNA testing because the technology was not available at the 
time of the trial. LC. § 19-4902(b). The petitioner must present a prima facie claim that identity 
The district court noted that Harrell had not stated which items should be subjected to 
DNA testing, but the court assumed Harrell was only requesting DNA testing of his underwear. 
Harrell's briefing before this Court references his underwear. 
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was at issue in the trial and that the evidence was subject to a sufficient chain of custody. I.C. 
§ 19-4902( c ). The district court must then allow the testing under reasonable conditions after the 
district court determines that: "(1) The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce 
new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the 
petitioner is innocent; and (2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible 
results under the Idaho rules of evidence." I.C. § 19-4902(e). 
Harrell argues a DNA test would show it is more probable than not that Harrell is 
innocent of the victim's rape. Harrell also asserts his confession was false. The State maintains 
that a DNA test would not show it is more probable than not that Harrell is innocent of the 
victim's rape. The State also contends Harrell should have raised the issue regarding the 
confession on direct appeal. 2 In the district court's memorandum decision summarily dismissing 
Harrell's amended second successive petition, the district court recalled the evidence presented 
at the rape trial. The district court determined that, even if evidence proved the victim was not 
the source of the blood on the underwear, the results would not provide evidence of a different 
perpetrator. The district court also determined that, in light of the other evidence, the results of a 
DNA test would not show that it is more probable than not that Harrell is innocent of the victim's 
rape. 
When there is a motion for summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the 
court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 
155, 160, 233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010). However, to prevent summary dismissal the petitioner must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
petitioner bears the burden of proof. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 728, 202 P.3d 642, 650 
(2008). A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding summary dismissal. Id. at 733, 202 P.3d at 655. "The application must be supported 
by written statements from competent witnesses or other verifiable information. Unsubstantiated 
and conclusory allegations are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." 
Pizzuto, 149 Idaho at 160,233 P.3d at 91 (citations omitted). 
2 The State further asserts the district court was not required to assume that DNA testing 
would be favorable to Harrell in granting summary dismissal. We need not address this 
argument, offering an alternative basis for affirming the district court's decision, as we are 
persuaded that a DNA test would not show it is more probable than not that Harrell is innocent of 
the victim's rape. 
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We are not persuaded by Harrell's argument that the lack of the victim's blood on his 
underwear would "greatly affect the analysis of the other surrounding circumstances and 
evidence" and show that Harrell was not the rapist. The results of a DNA test would not refute 
the testimony of the victim's friends and would not refute the confession given by Harrell. 
Harrell's contention that his confession was false should have been raised on direct appeal. The 
scope of post-conviction relief is limited. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 438, 163 P.3d 222, 
227 (Ct. App. 2007). A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. LC. 
§ 19-4901 (b ). A claim or issue that was or could have been raised on appeal may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings. Id; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348-49, 247 
P.3d 210, 213-14 (Ct. App. 2010). 
We conclude that the district court did not err by denying DNA testing of the blood stain 
and summarily dismissing the amended successive petition for post-conviction relief. The 
results of a DNA test would not show that it is more probable than not that Harrell is innocent of 
the victim's rape. The district court correctly determined that the State was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court's judgment summarily dismissing Harrell's 
amended second successive petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed. 
Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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